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Abstract: Securing the vehicle has become an important matter in the automotive industry. The communication of
vehicles increases tremendously, they communicate with each other and to the infrastructure, they will be
remotely diagnosed and provide the users with third-party applications. Given these areas of application, it
is evident that a security standard for the automotive domain that considers security from the beginning of
the development phase to the operational and maintenance phases is needed. Proposed security models in the
automotive domain describe how to derive different security levels that indicate the demand on security, but do
not further provide methods that map these levels to predefined system requirements nor security mechanisms.
We continue at this point and describe open problems that need to be addressed in a prospective security
framework for the automotive domain. Based on a study of several safety and security standards from other
areas as well as suggested automotive security models, we propose an appropriate representation of security
levels which is similar to, and will work in parallel with traditional safety, and a method to perform the
mapping to a set of predefined system requirements, design rules and security mechanisms.
1 INTRODUCTION
New technologies and functionalities are constantly
introduced to vehicles. Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication
enables vehicles to share information with each other
and send warnings, e. g., about roadworks and traf-
fic jams. Remote diagnostics is performed by vehi-
cle manufacturers and licensed repair shops, and plat-
forms for third-party applications in vehicles are also
provided. As a consequence of this ongoing transi-
tion, a security standard is crucial in order to secure
vehicles against modifications, hacks, and espionage.
The exposure of serious vulnerabilities underlines
the need for security in the automotive domain. The
attack surface of modern vehicles was analysed by
[Checkoway et al., 2011] and they demonstrated vul-
nerabilities in the Tire-Pressure Monitoring System,
media-player, OBD-II port, and Bluetooth. Further-
more, [Miller and Valasek, 2014] provide a survey of
attack surfaces of several vehicle models and [Yan,
2015] presents vulnerabilities in connected vehicles
using different attack vectors.
A systematic approach dealing with the aforemen-
tioned security threats is necessary, and in addition, an
automotive security standard is needed to harmonise
the hardware and software security requirements be-
tween the vehicle manufacturers and the suppliers.
This becomes evident when vehicle manufacturers get
more dependent on their suppliers since the complex-
ity of third-party modules is increasing and the mod-
ules are required to be reliable and secure. A secu-
rity framework which also contains a mapping to sys-
tem requirements and design rules containing guide-
lines describing how these demands can be fulfilled,
increases the efficiency during the development and
testing due to the fixed structure and guidance, as
well.
The need for such a security standard has also
been identified by the industry, which initiated the
ISO/SAE AWI 21434 Road Vehicles – Cybersecurity
engineering. This work item is ongoing and currently
under development. Proposed security models, such
as EVITA [Henniger et al., 2009] and HEAVENS [Is-
lam et al., 2016], describe methods from identifying
threats to classifying them into security levels. Both
models focus on the identification of risks and threats,
and how to classify them. HEAVENS describes meth-
ods to derive application specific requirements, but
does not perform a mapping to predefined require-
ments nor security mechanisms that are required for
each security level. EVITA on the other hand lists the
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results of their risk analysis in [Ruddle et al., 2009],
but does not provide a mapping to generic security
requirements based on the security level.
Information security is concerned with confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability, which will be later
extended according to STRIDE [ISO 15408, 2009,
Microsoft Corporation, 2005]. We define security lev-
els similar to [Islam et al., 2016]. Security levels rep-
resent the necessity and extent for security measures
in a specific function or module. The factors taken
into account when deriving the security levels depend
on the underlying security model that considers the
severity of potential attacks, required expertise to per-
form the attack, or the impact for the involved parties
in case of the attack. We split security requirements in
two groups, system requirements and application spe-
cific requirements. System requirements are generic
security requirements that need to be fulfilled for a
certain security level and describe design rules or se-
curity functions. Application specific requirements
are the result of a threat analysis and include indi-
vidual requirements that are not covered by system
requirements. Security mechanisms are methods to
fulfil a requirement, for instance the choice of encryp-
tion algorithms to provide confidentiality of informa-
tion, or use of access control lists to restrict the data
flow in the in-vehicle network.
In this paper, we survey proposed security models
and acclaimed standards in the area of safety and
security, we investigate how these standards or
models classify safety and security, and how they
perform the transition to system requirements.
Our contributions in this paper are the following:
• A study on safety and security standards, along
with proposed security models for the automotive
domain.
• Propose methods for how to move forward from
unique requirements of individual systems and
identified security levels to a set of mandatory sys-
tem requirements, design rules and security mech-
anisms and
• show that such requirements should be based on
the security level of the function to be imple-
mented.
• We show the benefits with having such a frame-
work in place when dealing with third-party de-
veloped functionality.
• We show the challenges and complexity of defin-
ing such a framework.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED
WORK
The difference between safety and security is that
safety is about handling malfunctioning behaviour
that is caused by random errors. Security threats are
caused by an attacker who intentionally wants to mod-
ify the system, harm involved people, or gather infor-
mation. It may be also the case that the owner, who
has physical access and unlimited time, slips in the
role of an attacker in order to perform unauthorised
modifications on the vehicle. The skills of attackers
may vary from limited to advanced depending on his
knowledge, purpose, and equipment. For these rea-
sons, security involves complex countermeasures. An
attacker who has successfully exploited a vulnerabil-
ity of one vehicle is able to apply the same method to
all vehicles of that specific model or even to all vehi-
cles of that manufacturer or supplier depending on the
kind of vulnerability [SAE J3061, 2016].
The large attack surface in vehicular security is an-
other difference to safety. Performing Hazard Analy-
sis and Risk Assessment (HARA) on functional safety
requires a narrower focus compared to assessing the
security of a system. The security assessment of a sys-
tem requires one to cope with a larger attack surface.
For instance, a vehicle that is able to communicate
with its infrastructure and cooperate with other vehi-
cles can not only be attacked locally, it can be attacked
through this communication channel as well. More-
over, vehicles have Internet access which additionally
increases the attack surface. Having a built-in mo-
bile communication unit also enables attacks via SMS
and other phone services. In addition to the wire-
less communication, Checkoway et al. showed other
attack vectors, such as an attack through the media-
player [ENISA, 2016, Checkoway et al., 2011].
Looking at the different areas shows that safety
has been adapted to the specific needs for this area.
[ISO 26262, 2011] is the standard for functional
safety of road vehicles, [RTCA DO-178, 2011] and
[RCTA DO-254, 2000] (software and hardware) are
customised for the aeronautics domain, and the rail-
way domain is described in CENELEC EN 50126,
CENELEC EN 50128, and CENELEC EN 50128.
[Blanquart et al., 2012] perform a comparison of the
criticality categories across safety standards in differ-
ent domains, including the aforementioned standards
and the corresponding safety standards for nuclear fa-
cilities and space systems. They highlight how these
domains differ from each other in terms of structure
and guidance throughout the development process.
Security standards exist in many areas, such as
programming, industrial automation, and system and
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device security. The [SEI CERT C, 2016] Coding
Standard, for instance, defines rules for specific pro-
gramming languages, in this case for C, and uses a
classification in levels to indicate the impact of not
addressing a certain rule. SEI CERT C shows how
certain programming traits have to be implemented in
order to be reliable, secure and safe. By following
these rules, undefined behaviour that may lead to vul-
nerabilities will to a large extent be eliminated. The
standard ranks each rule with an example and its pri-
ority and level. A combination of severity, likelihood
and remediation costs results in such a level ranging
from 1 to 3. The priorities are directly mapped to the
levels.
[NIST SP 800-53r4, 2013] is catalogue of secu-
rity controls and assessment procedures for informa-
tion systems. The security controls are split in 18
families, such as Access Control, Incident Response,
and Identification and Authentication. Consequently,
each family comprises security controls mapped to
priority and impact levels (low, medium, high). Se-
curity controls are nested, the lowest priority level has
to be implemented first and controls with higher prior-
ity have to be implemented in addition to the controls
with a lower priority level.
Security models for the automotive domain have
been proposed by various researchers. [Burton et al.,
2012] suggest a method that extends ISO 26262 with
security analysis. A combined safety and security
development lifecycle is presented by Schmittner et
al. in [Schmittner and Ma, 2014, Schmittner et al.,
2015]. Burton et al. and Schmittner et al. both
focus on the differences between safety and secu-
rity and how to combine them, but they do not dis-
cuss how predefined system requirements or design
rules for security can be defined. Common Cri-
teria [ISO 15408, 2009] is a standard for evaluat-
ing security properties of systems and devices. The
similarities of ISO 26262 and Common Criteria are
discussed in [Schmittner and Ma, 2014]. The au-
thors describe the relationship between the Automo-
tive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) from ISO 26262
and the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) from
Common Criteria according to the strictness and de-
gree of formalism. The SAHARA method presented
by [Macher et al., 2015] combines the existing HARA
known from ISO 26262 with a security assessing
method considering the needed resources and know-
how. Macher et al. do not describe a method to de-
rive system requirements based on the resulting se-
curity level. The EVITA [Henniger et al., 2009] and
HEAVENS [Islam et al., 2016] models describe the
procedure on how to derive security levels and how
these can be used for requirement engineering, how-
ever, they do not perform a mapping to system re-
quirements as we propose.
Guidelines for cybersecurity with respect to the
automotive domain are [SAE J3061, 2016] and
[ENISA, 2016]. Both guidelines provide good prac-
tice examples and recommendations, whereas ENISA
limits the scope by excluding autonomous vehicles
and V2V communication in their guideline. An-
other difference is that J3061 sets the focus on the
necessary processes and their implementation, while
ENISA describes the typical architecture of smart ve-
hicles and possible threats and attacks. J3061 lists
Threat, Vulnerabilities, and implementation Risks
Analysis (TVRA), which is a threat and risk assess-
ment method developed by ETSI in TS 102 165-
1 [ETSI, TS, 2011]. According to J3061, this model is
not suited for control and data networks of vehicles, as
it was developed specifically for telecommunications
networks. These two guidelines for cybersecurity ad-
dress important subjects, but do not discuss methods
for mapping to system requirements nor mechanisms.
3 THE COMPLEXITY IN
AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY
Lifetime. The automotive domain differs in many
ways from other areas. A vehicle has a lifetime of
about 150.000 to 300.000 km [Hawkins et al., 2012].
During this time, the vehicle has to be safe, secure,
firmware needs to be updated, the owner may change,
and vehicle parts or modules need to be replaced.
Discovering a security vulnerability in the vehicle re-
quires a fast reaction and update distribution to the ve-
hicles. Once a severe security problem has been iden-
tified, over-the-air updates provide efficient means for
distribution as they are much faster than a recall of
a certain vehicle model or vehicles with a specific
component from a supplier. In addition, over-the-air
updates are needed because security requirements 20
years from now are likely to be different from what is
designed today, since the expected lifetime from de-
sign of security functionality to the expected end of
the vehicle lifetime can be as much as 20 – 25 years.
Interplay between safety and security. The safety
of the passengers has to be retained in all situations.
Fault detection mechanisms have to be designed in
such a way that they cannot be exploited by an at-
tacker. For example, the use of redundant modules
for increased safety, may open up for attacks where
both modules believe the other one is active while it
is the attacker who sends the messages.
Compliance to standards. One specific challenge
for heavy duty vehicles is the required compliance to
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[SAE J1939, 2013]. This standard specifies the exact
content of frames that have to be transmitted within
the in-vehicle network. To comply, the frames may
not be changed and thus encryption mechanisms may
not be used. This restriction limits the set of suitable
security mechanisms.
Compliance between manufacturers and suppli-
ers. The suppliers will provide modules with more
functionalities and may also need to maintain the se-
curity of their products. Manufacturers integrate soft-
ware, and hardware modules from third-party devel-
opers and in-house developed modules into a vehicle
and thus need to ensure the security and safety of all
modules individually and combined. A well-defined
framework with strict system requirements for secu-
rity functions and mechanisms to be used, would sim-
plify the requirement specifications and communica-
tions between these two parties.
Maintenance. Authorised workshops need to be
able to diagnose the vehicle and replace modules in
case of a failure. For this reason, they need to, for in-
stance, be able to handle the change of security keys
in an offline and online environment. Authorised de-
vices may also need to be revoked in case of theft.
Alignment with ISO 26262. The harmonisa-
tion/alignment with the functional safety standard for
road vehicles [ISO 26262, 2011] is important when
introducing a new framework for automotive security.
ISO 26262 has a high acceptance in the automotive
domain and would, for this reason, significantly re-
duce the time required for introducing such a secu-
rity framework, because of the already known pro-
cesses. The question is to which extent it should be
harmonised. Strong harmonisation has the advantage
of easier integration due to known processes, but it
may not be ideal for security due to the fundamental
differences to safety.
Guidance. The necessary level of guidance has to
be defined. Providing a strict guidance for each re-
quirement may not be feasible or optimal for certain
cases. The developers may, for certain security re-
quirements, find other countermeasures that are more
suitable. On the other hand, sparse guidance leads
to overhead when evaluating security of third-party
components and individual solutions may not corre-
spond to best practices.
We address these problems by investigating how
standards and other security models handle guidance
and propose a method able to cope with the problems
listed above.
4 STANDARDS AND MODELS
In this section, we describe standards, models, and ap-
proaches that influence the design of safety and secu-
rity by assigning levels according to a defined scheme.
They are all well-known and accepted in their domain
or applicable for the automotive area. The insights
into how these standards allocate safety or security
levels and how they perform the mapping to require-
ments are further used for our suggested framework.
The related standards and models being described in
detail are [ISO 26262, 2011], [RTCA DO-178, 2011],
EVITA [Henniger et al., 2009], HEAVENS [Islam
et al., 2016], Trust Assurance Levels [Kiening et al.,
2013], and [IEC 62443, 2013].
First, we describe the purpose of the standards
and models followed by a discussion on the number
of levels their analysis results in. Next, we discuss
the impact of the levels in the design and develop-
ment of the system and investigate how the standards
or models address the relation between requirements
and allocated levels. Do they provide strict informa-
tion about the requirements necessary for each level
or is the mapping between the allocated levels and the
requirements without guidance?
4.1 Safety Standards
ISO 26262 applies HARA for a system without safety
measures by taking the severity, exposure, and the
controllability into account. A hazard is defined by
ISO 26262 as malfunctioning behaviour that poten-
tially causes harm. After identifying the levels for
each class, such as severity and controllability, they
are mapped according to a predefined matrix to the
ASIL levels. The ASIL levels comprise QM, A, B,
C, and D, where QM corresponds to Quality Man-
agement, i.e., a non-safety relevant event which does
not require any further safety consideration in the de-
sign and development of the system. Events classi-
fied as ASIL D, the highest level, require the highest
demand regarding risk reduction. In case a system
failure causes several hazards, the highest occurring
ASIL rating has to be applied [ISO 26262, 2011].
Next, a safety goal is defined for each hazardous
event. The safety goals are subsequently associated
with a functional safety concept, which states how
the safety goal can be achieved. The next step is to
formulate a technical safety concept describing how
the functionality is going to be implemented by hard-
ware and software on the system level. The soft-
ware and hardware safety requirements describe the
specific requirements, which will be implemented.
The requirements inherit their ASIL level from their
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safety goal respectively their parent requirement [ISO
26262, 2011].
ISO 26262 provides guidelines and requirements
for each level on system, hardware, software, produc-
tion, and operation level. In addition to the speci-
fied requirements for each ASIL level, this standard
also provides three levels of recommendations, no
recommendation (◦), recommended (+), and highly
recommended (++). The method independent paral-
lel redundancy as a mechanism for error handling at
the software architectural level, for instance, is rec-
ommended for ASIL C and highly recommended for
ASIL D [ISO 26262, 2011].
DO-178 is the safety standard for the aeronautics
domain, its categories are called Development As-
surance Levels (DAL). The DALs are representing
the effects of a failure condition, e. g., catastrophic or
hazardous. The five DALs range from A, the most
demanding level, to E, which is the equivalent to
ASIL QM. A top-level function is mapped to the
Function DAL (FDAL) according to a table that asso-
ciates the failure condition class and the quantitative
safety requirement (failures per hour) with the DAL.
These top-level functions are decomposed to sub-
functions, which are further decomposed to items. It
may be the case that a top-level function is divided
into more than one sub-function, where one of the
sub-functions has a lower or the same DAL as the top-
level function. DO-178 also provides guidance, but
not to the same extent as ISO 26262 [Blanquart et al.,
2012, RTCA DO-178, 2011, RCTA DO-254, 2000].
4.2 Security Models in the Automotive
Domain
The HEAVENS and EVITA projects define models to
derive security levels. [Henniger et al., 2009] describe
a model developed in the EVITA project. [Islam et al.,
2016] propose an ISO 26262 compliant model as part
of the HEAVENS project. Both models specify how
to identify threats and classify them into security lev-
els.
Henniger et al. use attack trees based on use cases
as base for the following requirements analysis. The
root of the attack tree is the goal of the attack. The
sub-levels contain sub-goals that can lead to the goal
of the parent node.
A risk assessment is performed for each poten-
tial attack. The mapping of the three components,
severity (4-component vector), probability of a suc-
cessful attack, and controllability, is derived from a
predefined table which leads to a security risk level.
This level is not associated to a single value, it is a
4-component vector describing the security risk level
for the elements of the severity vector. The levels for
each element are in the range [0,7], where 0 repre-
sents no risk and 6 the highest risk. Level 7 and 7+
are used for safety critical threats with controllability
C ≥ 3 and severity high [Henniger et al., 2009].
The authors further discuss how the security risk
levels can be used to prioritise security requirements.
Requirements resulting from the developed use cases
and risk assessment are listed in [Ruddle et al., 2009].
Henniger et al. highlight that not only the highest rat-
ing should be considered, the number of occurrences
in the attack trees has to be considered as well. A
lower risk that is seen in several attack trees may have
the same importance as a level 5 or higher risk that
appears only once in the attack tree [Henniger et al.,
2009].
The HEAVENS risk assessment model suggested
by Islam et al. describes the workflow for identify-
ing assets and threats (threat analysis), and a method
describing how to perform the risk assessment. Islam
et al. apply Microsoft’s STRIDE model [Microsoft
Corporation, 2005] to identify the asset/threat pairs.
The result of the risk assessment is the security
level, which is a combination of the threat level and
the impact level. The levels for the resulting secu-
rity level are QM, low, medium, high, critical. Is-
lam et al. highlight the parallels to ISO 26262. The
functional safety requirements derived from the safety
goals in ISO 26262 have the same property as the
high-level security requirements originating in the as-
set/threat pair and their corresponding security level.
Both are high-level requirements that are indepen-
dent from the implementation. These requirements
are consequently divided into technical security re-
quirements on system level, which further result in
hardware and software security requirements.
4.3 Trust Assurance Levels for V2X
Communication
The purpose of the Trust Assurance Levels is to
classify the security of Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)
communication nodes. [Kiening et al., 2013] provide
the minimum requirements for each Trust Assurance
Level (TAL) and discuss the benefits of certifying
V2X nodes and how to perform the verification of
security. The mapping of the TAL is performed ac-
cording to a predefined table. This table contains the
minimum requirements and a description of security
implications for each level. The proposed levels are
nested and range from 0 to 4. A node with TAL 0
does not have any security measures. With an increas-
ing TAL, the core V2X communication modules and
other relevant modules of the node need to be secured.
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For instance, TAL 4 requires all involved modules to
be protected. Moreover, the authors map the TALs to
the EALs of Common Criteria [Kiening et al., 2013].
4.4 Cyber Security Standard - IEC
62443
[IEC 62443, 2013] is a group of security standards for
Industrial Automation and Control Systems. Part 3
describes the system security requirements and secu-
rity levels. The security levels range from 0 to 4 and
are further split into Target Security Levels (SL-T),
Achieved SLs (SL-A), and Capability SLs (SL-C).
A security level of 0 corresponds to no specific re-
quirements for security and level 4 implies the high-
est demand on security. SL-T is derived from a con-
sequence analysis on a particular system, called zone,
and describes the desired security level. During the
iterative design phase SL-A and SL-T are compared
with each other after every cycle. Components and
systems need to provide the SL-C that indicates its
capability in regards to the defined security levels.
In case that SL-C does not meet the required SL-
T, compensating countermeasures have to be imple-
mented [IEC 62443, 2013].
The high-level requirements are named Founda-
tional Requirements (FRs) and consist of seven el-
ements, e. g., system integrity, data confidentiality,
and use control. These FRs are consequently broken
down into System Requirements (SRs) and Require-
ment Enhancements (REs). The security level for a
specific zone or component does not consist of a sin-
gle value, it is a 7-component vector describing the
security level for each FR. A table in IEC 62443 maps
the SRs and REs to the security level of each FR [IEC
62443, 2013].
Equation 1 shows the composition of the Security
Levels (SLs) in IEC 62443. Each component listed
in this vector refers to a FR. An example shown in
IEC 62443-3-3 is the SL-T of a basic process control
system zone. It is specified that this zone requires a
SL of 3 for the FRs Restricted data flow and Resource
availability. In contrast, measures to provide Data
confidentiality are not required, as the SL is 0.
Table 1 provides an overview of the reviewed stan-
dards and models. It highlights the differences be-
tween safety and security. Functional safety stan-
dards have five different levels whereas the automo-
tive security models, such as EVITA and HEAVENS,
use a more complex representation of security or risk
levels. IEC 62443, developed for the security of
industrial automation and control systems, classifies
security as a 7-component vector with a range of
five levels for each element and differs compared to
ISO 26262 with respect to how it relates the SLs to
requirements.
SL=

Identification & authentication ctrl.
Use control
System integrity
Data confidentiality
Restricted data flow
Timely response to events
Resource availability

=

2
2
0
1
3
1
3
 (1)
5 PROPOSED SECURITY
LEVELS AND MAPPING
Our previous discussion about the problems of im-
plementing security in vehicular systems followed by
a survey of standards and models, are the base for
the following suggestion for the number and repre-
sentation of security levels, and the mapping to sys-
tem requirements, design rules and security mecha-
nisms. Investigating how established standards and
proposed security models define a classification in
form of Security Levels (SLs) is important for sug-
gesting an automotive security framework. Addition-
ally, we discuss how to evaluate or even certify the se-
curity compliance of a module, and how well our pro-
posed framework is aligned with ISO 26262. We want
to highlight that the suggested solutions are a proposal
based on the review of several standards and models
from safety or other security domains and should pro-
vide a recommendation to future research.
5.1 Number of Security Levels
The decision on the number of SLs and the mapping
to system requirements strongly depends on the un-
derlying model for risk/threat assessment. Models
differ in their composition and weights for parame-
ters, such as expertise to perform the attack, opportu-
nity, and impact level.
Both functional safety standards, ISO 26262 and
DO-178, use five levels to classify safety, but secu-
rity models propose different solutions. The TALs
with the focus on V2X communication security use
five levels. Two automotive security models propose
a more complex classification of security or risk lev-
els. EVITA focusses on the risk of security relevant
attacks by representing the risk as a 4-component vec-
tor and HEAVENS associates the SLs with a specific
asset/threat pair.
Following the HEAVENS approach by using its
classification of SLs leads to one level in the range
of 0 to 4 for each threat/asset pair, meaning that the
VEHITS 2018 - 4th International Conference on Vehicle Technology and Intelligent Transport Systems
256
Table 1: Overview of the reviewed Standards in respect to their classification approach.
ISO 26262 DO-178 IEC 62443 TAL EVITA HEAVENS
Field of Application Safety Safety Security Security Security Security
# Security Levels 5 5 5 5 8 5
Representation / vector size 1 1 7 1 4 1a
Predefined System Requirements ( )b – – –
a HEAVENS associates each threat/asset pair with a SL.
b ISO 26262 provides recommendations for specific methods depending on the SL.
threat violating confidentiality of an individual asset
ranges between these levels. Continuing with defin-
ing high-level requirements and technical security re-
quirements for each threat/asset pair would only result
in more overhead. Instead, we recommend the use
of system requirements, which describe the necessary
security measures for each type of threat and secu-
rity attribute and thus provide the developer already
with necessary requirements that need to be fulfilled
depending on the SL.
The classification of SLs needs to provide suffi-
cient categories to have a distinct separation of the
required security measures. Having a wide range of
SLs may lead to an overly detailed guidance, which
may be inefficient due to the high granularity of re-
quirements and the difficulty to distinguish between
the SLs.
Since security needs to address many different as-
pects or attributes, such as the authenticity of mes-
sages and their origin, system integrity, and data con-
fidentiality, it is reasonable to use a vector defining
the SL for each component representing one of these
areas. The SL of each component is in the range of 0
to 4. Such an approach is described in IEC 62443 and
seems to be appropriate for the automotive domain
as well, as the representation as a single value may
lead to imbalanced security measures. For certain
modules or subsystems, it might be necessary to pro-
vide data confidentiality, whereas data integrity might
be of greatest importance for many other subsystems,
hence, it is benefiting to distinguish between such at-
tributes and assign them SLs individually. In addition,
a vector representation eases the communication be-
tween the parties, as a vector already combines the
demanded level of security for each attribute.
Furthermore, we suggest to distinguish between
target, achieved and capability SL, as described in
IEC 61442. Modules provided by suppliers, or in-
house developed modules should be classified accord-
ing to their security capability (SL-C). This may lead
to a more efficient reuse of developed modules, as
they are clearly marked with the SL they are capa-
ble of. This approach also simplifies the design of the
system, since modules and systems can be labelled
with their target SL (SL-T) that states the necessary
system requirements and design rules.
Describing security as a vector instead of a sin-
gle value is different to ISO 26262, nevertheless, we
believe that it is unavoidable to present security as a
structure describing several attributes. As an exam-
ple, SL(auth.) = 1 may require a verification of the
new firmware when performing an upgrade, whereas
SL(auth.) = 3 may require a firmware verification at
every start-up and SL(auth.) = 4 may additionally re-
quire the authenticity of messages sent and received
within this particular subsystem. IEC 62443 and other
security models also use a vector or other similar ap-
proaches and thus support our choice.
5.2 Mapping to Security Requirements
and Mechanisms
There are different ways to map SLs to system re-
quirements and security mechanisms. One option is
to perform a binary mapping of the SLs, e. g., a sys-
tem requirement has to or does not have to be ful-
filled. An alternative is the introduction of recommen-
dations in combination to the binary mapping, which
is a closer approach to ISO 26262. The presentation
of the requirements for certain SLs, is another impor-
tant aspect.
ISO 26262 lists the requirements and recommen-
dations in separate documents, e. g., description for
system, hardware and software level. IEC 62443 on
the other hand provides a compact overview of the
required security measures. The System Require-
ments (SRs) and Requirement Enhancements (REs)
of a Foundational Requirement (FR) are mapped to
the SLs. The demands for fulfilling a SL of a FR is re-
flected in the required SRs and REs. For lower levels,
it is sufficient to only fulfil a few requirements, but in
order to provide the highest SL, one must fulfil all SRs
and REs. This way, it is ensured that also modules or
subsystems with lower SLs provide basic methods to
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Table 2: Binary Mapping of Security Levels to System Re-
quirements and Requirement Enhancements.
FR 1 0 1 2 3 4
none low medium high critical
SR 1 • • • •
SR 2 • • •
RE 2.1 • •
RE 2.2 •
SR 3 • • •
. . .
ensure a specific security attribute. Table 2 illustrates
the structure of this approach. It shows which SRs and
REs of FR 1 are required for each SL. For instance,
SL 1 requires only SR 1, whereas SL 2 requires SR 1,
SR 2, and SR 3. Higher levels demand also the RE
2.1 respectively RE 2.1 and RE 2.2.
The FRs and their associated SRs and REs shown
in Table 2 still need to be defined. One approach is to
use the FRs of IEC 62443 (see Equation 1) as a base
and adjust the SRs and REs by incorporating auto-
motive specific requirements which are described in
Section 3, e. g., the possibility to exchange vehicle
parts in an offline environment (offline distribution of
cryptographic keys) and offline diagnostics in a work-
shop (see Section 3). Another approach we propose
is to combine the structure of IEC 62443 with HEAV-
ENS – the FRs are the security attributes, which are
mapped to Microsoft’s STRIDE model [Islam et al.,
2016, Microsoft Corporation, 2005]. This leads to a
6-component vector for each asset, as shown in Equa-
tion 2. This example shows the security demands for
each element, e. g., the demands for integrity are high,
whereas there are no demands on confidentiality. Ad-
ditionally, SRs and REs for each FR have to be de-
fined and mapped to the SLs.
With this approach, it is possible to incorporate
design rules in the SRs as well. Plausible design rules
may be the physical isolation of critical networks,
multi-factor authentication of diagnostic devices or
other modules with a critical SL, or the composition
of modules with different SLs in one control unit.
SL =

Authenticity
Integrity
Non-repudiation
Confidentiality
Availability
Authorisation
=

2
3
1
0
2
1
 (2)
A mapping to specific security mechanisms can
Table 3: Combined presentation of security and functional
safety levels.
0 1 2 3 4
QM A B C D
Se
cu
ri
ty
Authenticity •
Integrity •
Non-repudiation •
Confidentiality •
Availability •
Authorisation •
Safety •
be performed through recommendations. The chal-
lenge when introducing such a mapping is its dynam-
ics. The mapping changes over time as cryptographic
algorithms may be considered as broken or exist-
ing hardware may have sufficient processing capa-
bilities to solve the cryptographic problem on which
the mechanism is built upon. Such recommendations
support the developers in choosing mechanisms that
satisfy a certain SL. They can be represented as a list
of requirements associated with certain mechanisms.
This method requires an individual identifier or a ver-
sion number for each mapping to a security mecha-
nism in order to provide a seamless documentation of
how the SRs have been addressed.
Tools for the secure implementation of software
are the [SEI CERT C, 2016] Coding Standard and the
[MISRA C:2012, 2013] Guideline, both give guid-
ance and provide rules to develop software that is safe,
secure, and reliable. ISO 26262, for instance, rec-
ommends the use of MISRA C. We propose to com-
ply with such a secure coding standard for any SL
greater than 0, as basic vulnerabilities inherited from
programming languages or the wrong use of it can be
limited this way.
We believe that a vector representation allows
the combination of demands from different disci-
plines, such as safety. Adding the ASIL levels from
ISO 26262 to the vector is beneficial when discussing
and deploying the requirements for a module or sub-
system, as the requirements of both areas have to be
implemented in the very same module or feature. Pro-
viding a vector or table as illustrated in Table 3 is thus
useful for the software architects and developers to
see if required safety mechanisms interfere with se-
curity requirements or vice versa. We propose such
a combined presentation of both, safety and security
demands, as it is necessary in order to fulfil the nec-
essary requirements.
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5.3 Evaluation and Certification
Providing evidence about how the SL has been
achieved is necessary for the vehicle manufacturers
in order to rely on the security capabilities of modules
offered by suppliers. Common Criteria, a standard for
IT security evaluation, specifies methods and require-
ments for each Evaluation Assurance Level. Schmit-
tner et al. perform in [Schmittner and Ma, 2014] a
mapping of the levels defined in Common Criteria
and the ASIL levels from ISO 26262. [Wooderson
and Ward, 2017] describe how the assessment as in
Common Criteria can be applied for cybersecurity in
vehicular systems. They further discuss the benefits
and disadvantages of an internal assessment and an
independent certification body.
We suggest, that evidence for compliance in form
of documents, such as the attack tree analysis or the
threat analysis and an overview how the identified
threats have been addressed, is sufficient for lower
SLs. However, components requiring a SL of high
(3) or critical (4) need to provide a more detailed doc-
umentation on how the security measures are taken
into account.
As the SLs consist of a vector, it is possible to de-
fine the level of detail for the required documentation
for each element (FR) of the vector. This way, it is
ensured that no unnecessary overhead for documenta-
tion has to be performed.
6 CONCLUSION
With the increasing functionality of modern vehicles,
it is essential to have a standardised security frame-
work for vehicles that specifies the development life-
cycle as well as System Requirements (SRs). A stan-
dard, such as ISO 26262 for functional safety of road
vehicles, is needed so that all involved parties, e. g.,
manufacturer and suppliers, share the same under-
standing for automotive security.
We provide a study on several safety and security
standards from different domains and discuss specific
problems that have to be solved before a similar se-
curity standard can be introduced in the automotive
domain. Based on this, we suggest a representation
of Security Levels (SLs), how to map them to SRs,
and discuss how the security compliance of systems
and modules with a certain SL can be proven.
The number of SLs found to be suitable is five.
Having five SLs not only harmonises with ISO 26262,
it allows also a sufficient guidance through specify-
ing system requirements and suitable security mech-
anisms. A higher number of levels leads to a stricter
guidance and would only increase the complexity of
the mapping to requirements. However, as shown in
IEC 62443 and two automotive security models, secu-
rity needs to address different attributes or categories,
e. g., confidentiality and integrity. For this reason, we
propose to define one SL for each category and conse-
quently use a vector for representation. Due to the use
of a vector, we also suggest to include safety as one
element in order to provide a matrix that presents all
safety and security demands, as safety measures may
interfere with security. Furthermore, we propose the
use of a capability SL (SL-C), similar to IEC 62443,
to be used as a classifier for the security of third-party
modules and all in-house developed modules.
Providing guidance in the process of mapping SLs
to system requirements as part of a security frame-
work has benefits, such as a common understanding
of the required security for each level, and the com-
pliance of products from suppliers. Adding recom-
mendations for how to implement certain SRs by pro-
viding suitable mechanisms, further guides the devel-
oper. It has to be highlighted that such recommenda-
tions need to be continuously maintained and updated
as security mechanisms might have to be revised due
to published exploitation methods.
The evaluation and compliance of components is
important for the vehicle manufacturer. During the
concept and design phase it has to be known what
the system or subsystems need to be capable of and
what components provided by suppliers are capable
of. For lower SLs, we believe that the documenta-
tion of the threat analysis and attack tree analysis to-
gether with documented proof providing information
how these security requirements have been handled,
is sufficient. For the SL high and critical, we propose
to adapt Common Criteria according to the specific
needs in the automotive domain.
In future work, the detailed security requirements
and mechanisms have to be identified, evaluated for
their applicability in the automotive domain, and
mapped to SLs. Additionally, it is necessary to in-
clude this proposed structure in a security framework
that is suitable for this domain.
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